Abstract. In 1933 Gödel introduced a calculus of provability (also known as modal logic S4) and left open the question of its exact intended semantics. In this paper we give a solution to this problem. We find the logic LP of propositions and proofs and show that Gödel's provability calculus is nothing but the forgetful projection of LP. This also achieves Gödel's objective of defining intuitionistic propositional logic Int via classical proofs and provides a Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov style provability semantics for Int which resisted formalization since the early 1930s. LP may be regarded as a unified underlying structure for intuitionistic, modal logics, typed combinatory logic and -calculus. §1. A need for a theory of proofs. 
). The BHK semantics is widely recognized as the intended semantics for intuitionistic logic ( [33] , [34] , [43] , [62] , [74] , [78] , [104] , [105] , [107] , [108] , [111] , [114] ). Its description uses the unexplained primitive notions of construction and proof (Kolmogorov used the term problem solution for the latter). It stipulates that
• a proof of A ∧ B consists of a proof of A and a proof of B,
• a proof of A ∨ B is given by presenting either a proof of A or a proof of B 1 ,
Received September 17, 1998; revised October 10, 2000. The research described in this paper was supported in part by ARO under the MURI program "Integrated Approach to Intelligent Systems", grant DAAH04-96-1-0341, by DARPA under program LPE, project 34145, and by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research, grant 96-01-01395. 1 Neither Heyting's paper [54] nor Kolmogorov's [58] contains the well-known extra condition on the disjunction: a proof of a disjunction should also specify which one of the disjuncts • a proof of A → B is a construction which, given a proof of A, returns a proof of B, • absurdity ⊥ is a proposition which has no proof, a proof of ¬A is a construction which, given a proof of A, would return a proof of ⊥.
The significance of formalizing the BHK semantics extends far beyond justifying the particular choice of axioms for constructive (intuitionistic) logic made by Heyting in 1930 [52] . Provability and proofs as objects appear in many other areas of logic and applications such as modal logics and logics of knowledge, -calculus and typed theories, nonmonotonic reasoning, automated deduction and formal verification. Logical systems with builtin provability were anticipated by Kolmogorov and Gödel since the 1930s. Kolmogorov in ( [59] ) commented on his BHK paper of 1932: "The paper [58] was written with the hope that the logic of solutions of problems would later become a regular part of courses on logic. It was intended to construct a unified logical apparatus dealing with objects of two types-propositions and problems."
The traditional mathematical model based on the arithmetical predicate of formal provability "there exists a code of a proof of F " ( § §3-4), fell short of meeting the above expectations. The unsolved BHK problem, as well as a closely related open problem of the intended semantics for Gödel's provability calculus S4, indicated that the basic theory of provability had not been built yet.
In this paper we introduce the Logic of Proofs LP dealing with both propositions and proofs. This logic is supplied with the adequate provability semantics, decidability and normalization theorems. We give solutions to the problem of the intended semantics for Gödel's provability calculus S4 and to the problem of BHK semantics for intuitionistic propositional logic Int (also known as IPC) along the lines of Gödel's papers [44] , [46] . These and other applications suggest that LP fills a certain gap in the foundations of proof theory. §2. Semantics for intuitionistic logic. Semantics of intuitionism is a welldeveloped area. This paper does not intend to teach "the true semantics" for Int but rather to show that LP achieves Kolmogorov and Gödel's objective to define Int via classical proofs.
There is an important distinction between Heyting's and Kolmogorov's descriptions of the BHK semantics. Presumably, Heyting intended to explain intuitionistic logic via special intuitionistic understanding of construction it is a proof of. This condition is redundant for the usual notion of proof since the predicate "p is a proof of F " is decidable: given a proof p we always know which one of the disjuncts it is a proof of. However, a similar condition appeared in Kleene realizability (cf. [56] ), where it makes perfect sense, since the predicate "r realizes F " is undecidable.
and proof. Since Heyting's formalization of the axiom system for intuitionistic logic ( [52] ), an impressive array of intuitionistically justified semantics for intuitionistic logic have been introduced by Kreisel, Kripke, Dyson, van Dalen, Leivant, Veldman, de Swart, Dummet, Troelstra, H. Friedman, Visser, and others (cf. [110] ). Those studies lie outside the scope of this paper. We note however that they do not seem to produce a satisfactory formalization of the BHK semantics. Here is a summary from van Dalen's chapter "Intuitionistic Logic" in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, v. 3 (1986) , p. 243 ( [110] ):
"The intended interpretation of intuitionistic logic as presented by Heyting . . . so far has proved to be rather elusive. . . . However, ever since Heyting's formalization, various, more or less artificial, semantics have been proposed." Kolmogorov in 1932 (and then Gödel in 1933) intended to interpret Int on the basis of the usual mathematical notion of proof (problem solution), and thus to provide a definition of Int within classical mathematics independent of intuitionistic assumptions. In this paper we follow the Kolmogorov-Gödel approach. In agreement with Gödel's papers [44] and [46] we assume that BHK "proofs" should correspond to proofs in some formal theory T T ⊢ F ⇐⇒ there is a BHK proof of F, and the predicate "p is a BHK proof of F " should be decidable. Naturally, we also expect a BHK semantics to be non-circular. In particular, BHK proofs should not denote derivations in Int itself.
Here is the list of major known classical semantics for intuitionistic logic 2 (Goldblatt, 1979, [48] ) Those interpretations have shown to be very instrumental for understanding intuitionistic logic though none of them qualifies as a BHK semantics.
Interpretations 1-5, 7, 8, 10 are not related to provability. In particular, Kleene realizability disclosed a fundamental computational content of formal intuitionistic derivations which is however totally different from the provability semantics. Kleene realizers are not proofs in a formal theory, 2 Comprehensive surveys of these and other semantics for intuitionistic logic can be found in [33] , [92] , [105] .
the predicate "r realizes F " is not decidable. Kleene Abstract computational and functional semantics for Int which did not address the issue of the original BHK semantics for Int were also studied in [71] , [94] and many other papers (cf. [18] , [22] , [106] ).
Kuznetsov-Muravitsky-Goldblatt semantics for Int is based on a nonconstructive notion "classically true and formally provable" incompatible with the BHK semantics. In particular, it does not contain any BHK constructions or proofs whatsoever. As far as S4 is concerned the KuznetsovMuravitsky-Goldblatt semantics turned out not to be adequate ( [27] , [29] ).
An attempt to formalize the BHK semantics directly was made by Kreisel in his theory of constructions ( [62] , [64] ). The original variant of the theory was inconsistent, and difficulties there occurred already at the propositional level. Goodman ([51] ) in 1970 fixed that gap but his solution involved a stratification of constructions into levels which ruined the BHK character of this semantics. In particular, a proof of A → B was no longer a construction that could be applied to any proof of A. A comprehensive account of the Kreisel-Goodman theory could be found in S. Weinstein's paper [114] of 1983, which concludes that "The interpretation of intuitionistic theories in terms of the notions of proof and construction . . . has yet, however, failed to receive a definitive formulation." §3. Defining intuitionistic logic in classical provability logic. One of the first papers on provability semantics for intuitionistic logic was published in 1928 by Orlov ([87] ) who suggested prefixing all subformulas of a formula by a provability operator. Gödel in 1933 ([44] ) introduced the modal calculus of provability (essentially equivalent to the Lewis modal system S4) and defined Int in this logic. Gödel's provability calculus is based on the classical propositional logic and has the modal axioms and rules
Gödel considered the translation t(F) of an intuitionistic formula F into the classical modal language: "box each subformula of F " apparently regarding such a translation to be a fair formalization of the Brouwer thesis intuitionistic truth = provability.
Gödel established that
thus providing a reading of Int-formulas as statements about classical provability. He conjectured that the converse ( ⇐= ) also held and concluded in [46] , pp. 100-101: Intuitionismus ist daraus ableitbar 3 . The ( ⇐= ) conjecture was proved in 1948 by McKinsey and Tarski ( [77] ). The ultimate goal, however, of defining Int via classical proofs had not been achieved, because S4 was left without an exact intended semantics of the provability operator 2:
. ֒→ REAL PROOFS
It is clear from [44] and [46] that by REAL PROOFS Gödel meant systems based on a proof predicate Proof(x, y) denoting "x is the code of a proof of the formula having a code y" for a classical first order theory containing Peano arithmetic PA. Gödel in [44] identified a problem there and pointed out that the straightforward reading of 2F as the formal provability predicate Provable(F ) = ∃x Proof(x, F ) did not work.
Let ⊥ be the boolean constant false and 2F be Provable(F ). Then 2⊥ → ⊥ corresponds to the statement Consis PA expressing consistency of PA. An S4-theorem 2(2⊥ → ⊥) expresses the assertion that Consis PA is provable in PA, which is false according to the second Gödel incompleteness theorem. Gödel's paper [44] left open two natural problems concerning 1. the exact intended semantics of Gödel's provability calculus S4, 2. the modal logic of the formal provability predicate Provable(F ). It was already clear, however, that 1 and 2 led to essentially different models of Provability, each targeting its own set of applications (cf. §12).
Problem 2 was solved by R. Solovay [100] who showed that the modal logic L 4 axiomatized all propositional properties of the formal provability, and by Artemov [4] and Vardanyan [112] who demonstrated that the first order logic of formal provability was not axiomatizable.
Problem 1 receives a solution in this paper (cf. also technical reports [7] , [9] ).
The issue of provability semantics for S4 was addressed by Lemmon [72] , Myhill [84] , [85] [32] , Artemov [5] , and many others. However, there were no adequate Gödelian provability semantics for S4 found 5 . Moreover, in [83] the problem was announced hopeless. §4. Explicit vs. implicit approaches. The above difficulties with reading S4-modality 2F as ∃x Proof(x, y) are caused by the non-constructive character of the existential quantifier. In particular, in a given model of arithmetic an element that instantiates the existential quantifier over proofs may be nonstandard. In that case ∃x Proof(x, F ) though true in the model, does not deliver a "real" PA-derivation and thus the reflection principle
is not internally provable. On the other hand, the explicit reflection principle
is internally provable for each natural number n. Indeed, if Proof(n, F ) holds, then F is provable. If Proof(n, F ) does not hold then its negation ¬ Proof(n, F ) is provable, since Proof(x, y) is a decidable relation. In both cases Proof(n, F ) → F is provable.
This consideration suggests the idea of developing an explicit provability logic by switching from the formal provability ∃x Proof(x, F ) to Proof(t, F ) and replacing the existential quantifiers on proofs by Skolem style operations on proofs.
Some of those operations appeared in the proof of Gödel's second incompleteness theorem. Within that proof (cf. [27] , [29] , [79] , [98] ), in order to prove what are now known as Hilbert-Bernays-Löb derivability conditions, one constructs computable functions m(x, y) and c(x) such that
Then these facts are usually relaxed to their simplified versions
sufficient to establish the incompleteness theorem.
In one of his lectures in 1938, first published in 1995 ( [46] , cf. [90] ), Gödel once again acknowledged the problem of provability semantics for S4 and mentioned a possibility of building an explicit version of S4 with basic propositions "t is a proof of F " (t : F in our notation) in order to get a semantics of proofs for Int. Though neither definitions nor axiomatization were given, Gödel's suggestion specified the format t : F of an expected solution of the provability semantics problem for S4 and for the BHK problem 6 . It turned out that in addition to Gödelian operations m(x, y) and c(x) one more operation on proofs is needed to capture the whole of S4.
The particular goals of this paper are 1. To find a complete axiom system for a classical propositional logic with additional atoms "t is a proof of F " sketched by Gödel in ( [46] ) and to give an intended semantics for Gödel's provability calculus S4.
We introduce a system of computable operations on proofs (proof polynomials) and establish the soundness and completeness of the resulting Logic of Proofs LP (Theorem 8.1 and Corollary 8.10). We show that LP realizes all of S4 (Theorem 9.4 and Corollary 9.5). This gives an adequate provability model for S4 along the lines of Gödel's suggestions (Corollary 9.6).
2.
To formalize the classical BHK semantics for Int and to establish the completeness of intuitionistic logic with respect to this semantics.
We consider realizations of Int by proof polynomials based on the Gödel embedding of Int in S4, and establish that this semantics is adequate (Theorem 9.9). This confirms Kolmogorov's assumption of 1932 that intuitionistic logic Int is the calculus of proofs (solutions to problems) in classical mathematics ( [58] , [59] ) and achieves the original objective by Gödel ([44] ) to define Int via the classical notion of proof. 3 . To enhance typed combinatory logic and typed -calculus.
We show that LP is an advanced system of typed combinatory logic and typed -calculus with iterated and multiple type assignments. LP admits types depending on terms, e.g., of the form s : (t : F ), and allows terms to have any given finite set of types.
Through realizations in LP both modality and -terms may be regarded as systems of proof polynomials. §5. Logic of Proofs. 
We call these terms proof polynomials and denote them by p, r, s, . . . . Constants correspond to proofs of a finite fixed set of axiom schemas. We will omit "·" whenever it is safe. We also assume that p · r · s . . . should be read as (. . 
. ((p · r) · s) . . . ), and p
Using t to stand for any term and S for any propositional letter, ⊤ or ⊥, formulas are defined by the grammar
We will use A, B, C , F , G, H for the formulas in this language, and Γ, ∆, . . . for the finite sets (also finite multisets, or finite lists) of formulas unless otherwise explicitly stated. We will also use x, y, z, . . 
. and p, r, s, . . . for vectors of proof variables and proof polynomials respectively. If
We assume the following precedences from highest to lowest: !, ·, +, :, ¬, ∧, ∨, →. We will use the symbol = in different situations, both formal and informal. Symbol ≡ denotes syntactical identity, E is the Gödel number of E, |s| is the length of s, i.e., the total number of symbols in s. We will skip the Gödel number symbol " " inside proof formulas and provability formulas (such as Prf, Proof, Provable, etc.) when it is safe.
The intended semantics for p : F is "p is a proof of F ", which will be formalized in the next section. Note that proof systems which provide a semantics for p : F are multi-conclusion ones, i.e., p may be a proof of several different F 's (see Comment 5.7).
Definition 5.2. We define the system LP 0 in the language of LP. Axioms:
A0. Finite set of axiom schemes of classical propositional logic
Rule of inference:
The system LP is LP 0 plus the rule
R2. A ⊢ c : A, if A is an axiom A0-A4, and c a proof constant "axiom necessitation"
A Constant Specification (CS) is a finite set of formulas c 1 : A 1 , . . . , c n : A n such that c i is a constant, and A i an axiom A0-A4. CS is injective if for each constant c there is at most one formula c : A ∈ CS (each constant denotes a proof of not more than one axiom). Each derivation in LP naturally generates the CS consisting of all formulas introduced in this derivation by the axiom necessitation rule. For a constant specification CS, by LP(CS) we mean LP 0 plus formulas from CS as additional axioms.
Comment 5. 3 . Atomic constant terms (combinators) of typed combinatory logic (cf. [104] ) may be regarded as proof constants. The combinator k A,B of the type A → (B → A) can be identified with a constant a specified as a :
Term variables of combinatory logic may be regarded as proof variables in LP, application as operation "·". In general a combinatory term t of the type F is represented by an LP-formula t : F . Typed combinatory logic CL → thus corresponds to a fragment of LP consisting of formulas of the sort t : F where t contains no operations other than "·" and F is a formula built from the propositional letters by "→" only.
There is no restriction on the choice of a constant c in R2 within a given derivation. In particular, R2 allows us to introduce a formula c : A(c), or to specify a constant several times as a proof of different axioms from A0-A4. One might restrict LP to injective constant specifications only without changing the ability of LP to emulate modal logic, or the functional and arithmetical completeness theorems for LP (below). However, we choose not to insist on injective constant specifications a priori.
Both LP 0 and LP enjoy the deduction theorem
and the substitution lemma:
Obviously, Moreover, if the constant specification CS in the original derivation is injective then the resulting constant specification is also injective and extends CS. ⊣ It is easy to see from the proof that the lifting polynomial t is nothing but a blueprint of a given derivation of F . Thus LP internalizes its own proofs as proof terms.
Corollary 5.5 (Necessitation rule for LP).
⊢ F =⇒ ⊢ p : F for some ground proof polynomial p.
We shall see in §9 that LP suffices to emulate all S4-derivations. Meanwhile Example 5.6 below shows how to derive in LP vs. S4.
may be considered as single-conclusion if one assumes that a proof derives only the end formula (sequent) of a proof tree. On the other hand, the same systems may be regarded as multi-conclusion by assuming that a proof derives all formulas assigned to the nodes of the proof tree. The logic of strictly single-conclusion proof systems was studied in [6] , [16] , and in [67] , [68] where it received a complete axiomatization (system FLP). However, FLP is not compatible with any modal logic. For example, FLP derives ¬(x : ⊤ ∧ x : (⊤ ∧ ⊤)), which has the forgetful projection ¬(2⊤ ∧ 2(⊤ ∧ ⊤)). The latter is false in any normal modal logic. Therefore, provability as a modal operator corresponds to multi-conclusion proof systems.
Single operators "t : " in LP are not normal modalities since they do not satisfy the property t : (P → Q) → (t : P → t : Q). This makes LP essentially different from polymodal logics, e.g. the dynamic logic of programs ( [60] ), where the modality is upgraded by some additional features. Rather in the Logic of Proofs the modality has been decomposed into a family of proof polynomials (see §9). §6. Standard provability interpretation of LP. In §6 and §8 by ∆ 1 and Σ 1 we mean the corresponding classes of arithmetical predicates. We will use x, y, z to denote individual variables in arithmetic and hope that the reader is able to distinguish them from the proof variables. If n is a natural number, then n will denote the numeral corresponding to n, i.e., the standard arithmetical term 0 ′′′... where ′ is the successor functional symbol and the number of ′ 's equals n. We will use the simplified notation n for a numeral n when it is safe. Definition 6.1. We assume that the first order Peano Arithmetic PA contains terms for all primitive recursive functions (cf. [98] , [101] ), called primitive recursive terms. Formulas of the form f( x) = 0 where f( x) is a primitive recursive term are standard primitive recursive formulas. A standard Σ 1 -formula is a formula ∃xϕ(x, y) where ϕ(x, y) is a standard primitive recursive formula. An arithmetical formula ϕ is provably Σ 1 if it is provably equivalent in PA to a standard Σ 1 -formula; ϕ is provably ∆ 1 if and only if both ϕ and ¬ϕ are provably Σ 1 . Definition 6.2. A proof predicate is a provably ∆ 1 -formula Prf(x, y) such that for every arithmetical sentence ϕ PA ⊢ ϕ ⇐⇒ for some n ∈ ⇐⇒ Prf(n, ϕ ) holds.
Prf(x, y) is normal if it satisfies the following two conditions:
The function from k to the code of T (k) is computable.
(conjoinability of proofs)
For any k and l there is n such that
The conjoinability property yields that normal proof predicates are multi-conclusion ones.
Comment 6.3. Every normal proof predicate can be transformed into a single-conclusion one by changing from
In turn, every single-conclusion proof predicate may be regarded as normal multi-conclusion by reading and all natural numbers k, n the following formulas are valid:
Proof. The following function can be taken as m:
is a true ∆ 1 -sentence for every ϕ ∈ T (k), therefore they are all provable in PA. Use conjoinability to find a uniform proof of all of them. ⊣ Note that the natural arithmetical proof predicate Proof(x, y) "x is the code of a derivation containing a formula with the code y"
is an example of a normal proof predicate.
Definition 6.5. An arithmetical interpretation * of the LP-language has the following parameters:
• a normal proof predicate Prf with the functions m(x, y), a(x, y) and c(x) as in Proposition 6.4, • an evaluation of propositional letters by sentences of arithmetic, • an evaluation of proof variables and constants by natural numbers. Let * commute with boolean connectives,
Under an interpretation * a proof polynomial t becomes the natural number t * , an LP-formula F becomes the arithmetical sentence F * . A formula (t : F ) * is always provably ∆ 1 . Note that PA is able to derive any true ∆ 1 -sentence, and thus to derive a negation of any false ∆ 1 -sentence (cf. [79] ). For a set X of LP-formulas by X * we mean the set of all F * 's such that F ∈ X . Given a constant specification CS, an arithmetical interpretation * is a CS-interpretation if all formulas from CS * are true (equivalently, are provable in PA). An LP-formula F is valid (with respect to the arithmetical semantics) if F * is true under all interpretations * . F is provably valid if PA ⊢ F * for any interpretation * . F is valid under constant specification CS if F * is true under all CS-interpretations * . F is provably valid under constant specification CS if PA ⊢ F * for any CS-interpretation * . It is obvious that provably valid yields valid. Proposition 6.6 (Arithmetical soundness of LP 0 ).
Proof. A straightforward induction on the derivation in LP 0 . Let us check the axiom t : F → F . Under an interpretation * (t : F → F ) * ≡ Prf(t * , F * ) → F * . Consider two possibilities. Either Prf(t * , F * ) is true, in which case t * is indeed a proof of F * , thus PA ⊢ F * and PA ⊢ (t : F → F ) * . Otherwise Prf(t * , F * ) is false, in which case being a false ∆ 1 -formula it is refutable in PA, i.e., PA ⊢ ¬ Prf(t * , F * ) and again PA ⊢ (t : F → F ) * . ⊣ Corollary 6.7 (Arithmetical soundness of LP).
LP(CS) ⊢ F =⇒ F is provably valid under the constant specification CS.
Comment 6.8. The standard provability semantics for LP above may be characterized as a call-by-value semantics, since the evaluation F * of a given LP-formula F depends upon the value of participating functions. A callby-name provability semantics for LP was introduced in [7] and then used in [67] , [68] , [97] , [115] . In the latter semantics F * depends upon the particular programs for the functions participating in * . §7. A sequent formulation of Logic of Proofs. By sequent we mean a pair Γ =⇒ ∆, where Γ and ∆ are finite multisets of LP-formulas. For Γ, F we mean Γ ∪ {F }. To simplify proofs we assume a boolean basis→, ⊥ and treat the remaining boolean connectives as definable ones.
Axioms of LPG 0 are sequents of the form Γ, F =⇒ F , ∆ and Γ, ⊥ =⇒ ∆. Along with the usual Gentzen sequent rules of classical propositional logic, including the cut and contraction rules (e.g., like G2c from [104] ), the system LPG 0 contains the rules
The system LPG is LPG 0 plus the rule
where A is an axiom A0-A4 from §5, and c is a proof constant. 
A saturated sequent is obtained by the following Saturation Algorithm A. Given Γ =⇒ ∆, for each undischarged formula S from Γ ∪ ∆ non-deterministically try to perform one of the following steps. At the moment 0 all formulas from Γ ∪ ∆ are available (undischarged). After a step is performed discharge S (make it unavailable). If none of the clauses 1-7 is applicable terminate with success.
if S = (A → B)
∈ Γ, then put A into ∆ or B into Γ, 2. if S = (A → B) ∈ ∆, then put A into Γ and B into ∆, 3 . if S = t : A ∈ Γ, then put A into Γ, 4. if S =!t : t : A ∈ ∆, then put t : A into ∆, 5 . if S = (s + t) : A ∈ ∆, then put both s : A and t : A into ∆, 6 . if S = (s · t) : B ∈ ∆, then for each X 1 , . . . , X n such that X i → B is a subformula in Γ, ∆ put either s : (X i → B) or t : X i into ∆, 7. if Γ ∩ ∆ = ∅ or ⊥ ∈ Γ, then backtrack. If backtracked to the root node terminate with failure. When backtracking to a given node make available again all the formulas discharged after leaving this node the previous time.
The Saturation Algorithm A always terminates. Indeed, A is finitely branching and each non-backtracking step breaks either a subformula of Γ =⇒ ∆ or a formula of the type t : F , where both t and F occur in Γ =⇒ ∆. There are only finitely many of those formulas, which guarantees termination. Moreover, A terminates with success. Indeed, otherwise A terminates at the root node Γ =⇒ ∆ of the computation tree with all the possibilities exhausted and no way to backtrack. Then the computation tree T of A contains the sequent Γ =⇒ ∆ at the root, and LPG 0 axioms at the leaf nodes. By a standard induction on the depth of a node in T one can prove that every sequent in T is derivable in LPG 
Here X 1 , . . . , X n is the list of all formulas such that X i → B is a subformula of Γ =⇒ ∆. By the induction hypothesis all the child sequents are derivable in LPG 
Γ is provably decidable, for each t the set I (t) = { X | t : X ∈ Γ } is finite
and a function from a code 7 of t to a code 8 of I (t) is provably computable, 2. Γ ⊆ Γ, ∆ ∩ Γ = ∅, 3. if t : X ∈ Γ, then X ∈ Γ, 4. if s : (X → Y ) ∈ Γ and t : X ∈ Γ, then (s · t) : Y ∈ Γ, 5. if t : X ∈ Γ, then !t : t : X ∈ Γ, 6. if t : X ∈ Γ, then (t + s) : X ∈ Γ and (s + t) : X ∈ Γ. Proof. We describe a completion algorithm COM that produces a series of finite sets of LP-formulas Γ 0 , Γ 1 , Γ 2 , . . .
For each i > 1 let COM do the following:
• if i = 3k + 1, then COM sets
• if i = 3k + 2, then COM sets
It is easy to see that at step i > 0 COM produces either a formula from Γ or formulas of the form t : X with the length of t greater than i/3. This observation secures the decidability of Γ. Indeed, given a formula F of length n wait until step i = 3n of COM; F ∈ Γ n if and only if F ∈ Γ. A similar argument establishes the finiteness of I (t) from which one can construct the desired provable computable arithmetical term for I (t).
In order to establish 2 and 3 we prove by induction on i that for all i = 0, 1, 2, . . .
The base case i = 0 holds because of the saturation properties of Γ 0 = Γ.
For the induction step assume the induction hypothesis that the properties A, B, and C hold for i and consider Γ i+1 . 7 For example, the Gödel number of t. 8 For example, the code of the finite set of Gödel numbers of formulas from I (t).
A. Suppose there is F ∈ Γ i+1 ∩∆ but F / ∈ Γ i . There are three possibilities. If i − 1 = 3k then F is (s · t) : Y such that s : (X → Y ), t : X ∈ Γ i for some X . From the description of COM it follows that (X → Y ) ∈ Γ. By the saturation properties of Γ =⇒ ∆, since (s · t) : Y ∈ ∆ and X → Y occurs in Γ either s : (X → Y ) ∈ ∆ or t : X ∈ ∆. In either case Γ i ∩ ∆ = ∅ which is impossible by the induction hypothesis.
If i − 1 = 3k + 1 then F is !t : t : X such that t : X ∈ Γ i . By the saturation properties of ∆, t : X ∈ ∆. Again Γ i ∩ ∆ = ∅ which is impossible by the induction hypothesis.
If i − 1 = 3k + 2 then F is (t + s) : X such that either t : X ∈ Γ i or s : X ∈ Γ i . By the saturation properties, from (t + s) : X ∈ ∆ conclude that both t : X ∈ ∆ and s : X ∈ ∆. Once again, Γ i ∩ ∆ = ∅ which is impossible by the induction hypothesis.
Thus
B. Suppose p : B ∈ Γ i+1 and p : B / ∈ Γ i . We conclude that in this case B ∈ Γ i+1 . Indeed, again there are three possibilities.
If
If i − 1 = 3k + 2 then p : B is (t + s) : B such that either t : B ∈ Γ i or s : B ∈ Γ i . By the induction hypothesis, in either case B ∈ Γ i , therefore B ∈ Γ i+1 . C. Suppose X → Y, X ∈ Γ i+1 . From the description of COM it follows that (X → Y ) ∈ Γ. By the saturation properties of Γ =⇒ ∆, either Y ∈ Γ or X ∈ ∆. In the former case we are done. If X ∈ ∆ then Γ i+1 ∩ ∆ = ∅, which is impossible by item A of the induction step.
Items 4, 5, and 6 of Lemma 7.5 are guaranteed by the definition of COM. Indeed, if some if condition is fulfilled, then it occurs at step i and COM necessarily puts the then formula into Γ i+3 at the latest. ⊣ §8. Completeness theorems. In this section we establish completeness and cut elimination theorems for the Logic of Proofs.
Theorem 8. 1 . The following are equivalent:
Proof. The steps from 1 to 2 and from 4 to 5 are trivial. The step from 2 to 3 follows from 7.1, and the step from 3 to 4 follows from 6. 6 . The only remaining step is thus from 5 to 1. We assume "not 1" and establish "not 5". Suppose LPG − 0 Γ =⇒ ∆. Our aim now will be to construct an interpretation * such that ( Γ → ∆) * is false (in the standard model of arithmetic).
From the saturation procedure (Lemma 7.4) get a saturated sequent Γ ′ =⇒ ∆ ′ , and then perform a completion (Lemma 7.5) to get a set of formulas Γ ′ .
We define the desired interpretation * on propositional letters S i , proof variables x j and proof constants a j first. We assume that Gödel numbering of the joint language of LP and PA is injective, i.e.,
for any expressions E 1 , E 2 , and that 0 is not a Gödel number of any expression. For a propositional letter S, proof variable x and proof constant a let
The remaining parts of * are constructed by an arithmetical fixed point equation below. For any arithmetical formula Prf(x, y) define an auxiliary translation † of proof polynomials to numerals and LP-formulas to PA-formulas such that S † = S * for any propositional letter S, t † = t for any proof polynomial t, (t : F ) † = Prf(t † , F † ), and † commutes with the propositional connectives. It is clear that if Prf(x, y) contains quantifiers, then † is injective, i.e., F † ≡ G † yields F ≡ G. Indeed, from F † ≡ G † it follows that the principal connectives in F and G coincide. We consider one case: (
for the corresponding k and n, this formula contains quantifiers. Therefore the formula (
† also contains quantifiers and thus contains a subformula of the form Prf(k 1 , n 1 ). However, (s :
† is impossible since the numbers of logical connectives and quantifiers in both parts of ≡ are different. Now the injectivity of † can be shown by an easy induction on the construction of an LP-formula. Moreover, one can construct primitive recursive functions f and g such that
Let (Proof, ⊗, ⊕, ↑) be the standard multi-conclusion proof predicate from §6, with ⊗ standing for "application", ⊕ for "sum" and ↑ for "proof checker" operations associated with Proof. In particular, for any arithmetical formulas ϕ, and any natural numbers k, n the following formulas are true:
Without loss of generality we assume that Proof( t , k) is false for any proof polynomial t and any k ∈ .
Let ϕ( y, z) be a provably Σ 1 arithmetical formula. Without loss of generality we assume that ϕ( y, z) is provably equivalent to ∃x (x, y, z) for some provably ∆ 1 -formula (x, y, z). By z.ϕ( y, z) we mean a function z = f( y) that given y 1. calculates the first pair of natural numbers (k, l ) such that (k, y, l ) holds 2. puts z = l .
It is clear that z.ϕ( y, z) is computable (though not necessarily total).
By the fixed point argument we construct a formula Prf(x, y) such that PA proves the following fixed point equation (FPE):
Prf(x, y) ↔ Proof(x, y) ∨ ("x = t for some t and y = B † for some B ∈ I (t)").
The arithmetical formula ". . . " above describes a primitive recursive procedure: given x and y recover t and B such that x = t and y = B † , then verify B ∈ I (t). From FPE it is immediate that Prf is a provably ∆ 1 -formula, since Proof(x, y) is provably ∆ 1 . It also follows from FPE that PA ⊢ yields Prf(k, ) for some k ∈ . We define the arithmetical formulas M (x, y, z), A(x, y, z), C (x, z) as follows. Here s, t denote proof polynomials.
M (x, y, z) ↔ ("x = s and y = t for some s and t" ∧ z = s · t ) ∨ ("x = s for some s and y = t for any t"
∨ ("x = s for any s and y = t for some t"
∨ ("x = s and y = t for any s and t" ∧ z = x ⊗ y).
A(x, y, z) ↔ ("x = s and y = t for some s and t" ∧ z = s + t ) ∨ ("x = s for some s and y = t for any t"
∨ ("x = s and y = t for any s and t" ∧ z = x ⊕ y).
∨ ("x = t for any t"
Here each of ". As follows from the above the functions m(x, y), a(x, y) and c(x) are computable. Moreover, Lemma 8.6 below yields that these functions are total.
We continue defining the interpretation * . Let Prf for * be the one from FPE, and the functions m(x, y), a(x, y) and c(x) are as above.
Lemma 8.2.
(a) t * = t † for any proof polynomial t, (b) B * ≡ B † for any LP-formula B.
Proof.
(a) Induction on the construction of a proof polynomial. Base cases are covered by the definition of the interpretation * . For the induction step note that according to the definitions, the following equalities are provable in PA:
(b) By induction on B. The atomic case when B is a propositional letter holds by the definitions. If B is t : F , then (t : F ) * ≡ Prf(t * , F * ). By (a), t * = t † . By the induction hypothesis, F * ≡ F † which yields
† . The inductive steps are trivial. ⊣ Corollary 8. 3 . The mapping * is injective on terms and formulas of LP.
In particular, for all expressions E 1 and E 2 4 . X * is provably ∆ 1 for any LP-formula X . Indeed, if X is atomic, then X * is provably ∆ 1 by the definition of
The latter formula is provably ∆ 1 , therefore (t : Y ) * is provably ∆ 1 . Since the set of provably ∆ 1 -formulas is closed under boolean connectives, X * is provably ∆ 1 for each X . Lemma 8. 5 .
Proof. By induction on the length of X . Base case, i.e., X is atomic or X = t : Y . Let X be atomic. By the definition of * , X * is true if and only
If t : Y ∈ ∆ ′ , then t : Y / ∈ Γ ′ and "Y ∈ I (t)" is false. The formula Proof(t * , Y * ) is also false since t * is t (by Lemma 8.2) and Proof(t, k) is false for any k by assumption. By FPE, (t : Y ) * is false. Since (t : Y ) * is provably ∆ 1 (Lemma 8.4) PA ⊢ ¬(t : Y ) * .
The induction steps corresponding to boolean connectives are standard and based on the saturation properties of Γ ′ =⇒ ∆ ′ . For example, let X = Y → Z ∈ Γ ′ . Then Y → Z ∈ Γ ′ , and by Definition 7.3, Y ∈ Γ ′ or Z ∈ ∆ ′ . By the induction hypothesis, Y * is true or Z * is false, and thus (Y → Z) * is true, etc. ⊣ Lemma 8. 6 . PA ⊢ ϕ ⇐⇒ Prf(n, ϕ) for some n ∈ . Proof. It remains to establish ( ⇐= ). Let Prf(n, ϕ) hold for some n ∈ . By FPE, either Proof(n, ϕ) holds or ϕ = B † for some B such that t : B ∈ Γ ′ . In the latter case by the saturation property of Γ ′ , B ∈ Γ ′ . By Lemma 8.5, PA ⊢ B * . By the injectivity of the Gödel numbering, ϕ ≡ B † . By Lemma 8.2, ϕ ≡ B * . Therefore PA ⊢ ϕ. ⊣ Lemma 8. 7 . For all arithmetical formulas ϕ, and natural numbers k, n the following is true: Prf(k, ϕ) ).
(a) Assume Prf(k, ϕ → ) and Prf(n, ϕ). There are four possibilities.
(i) Neither of k, n is a Gödel number of a proof polynomial. By FPE, both Proof(n, ϕ) and Proof(k, ϕ → ) hold, so Proof(k ⊗ n, ) does also.
(ii) Both k and n are equal to Gödel numbers of some proof polynomials, say k = s and n = t . By FPE, ϕ is F * and is G * for some LPformulas F , G such that F → G ∈ I (s) and F ∈ I (t). By the closure property of Γ ′ (Lemma 7.5 (4)), G ∈ I (s · t). By FPE, Prf(s · t, G * ). By Lemma 8.2 and by definitions, PA proves that
Thus m(k, n) = s · t and Prf(m(k, n), ) is true.
(iii) k is not equal to the Gödel number of a proof polynomial, n = t for some proof polynomial t. By FPE, Proof(k, ϕ → ) and ϕ ≡ F † for some LP-formula F such that F ∈ I (t). Compute the number
by the following method. Take 
Case (iv): "s is a Gödel number of a proof polynomial but t is not a Gödel number of any proof polynomial" is similar to (iii).
Part (b) can be checked in the same way as (a).
(c) Given Prf(k, ϕ) there are two possibilities.
(i) k = t for some proof polynomial t. By FPE, ϕ ≡ F † for some F such that F ∈ I (t). By the closure property 7.5 (5) of Γ ′ , !t : t : F ∈ Γ ′ . By Lemma 8.5, (!t : t : F ) * holds. By definitions,
By Lemma 8.2, t * = t and F * ≡ F † . Therefore t * = k, F * ≡ ϕ and
(ii) k = t for any proof polynomial t. By FPE, Proof(k, ϕ) holds. By definition of the proof checking operation ↑ for Proof, Proof(↑k, Proof(k, ϕ) ).
By the definition of C , in this case PA ⊢ c(k) = l ⊗ ↑k where l equals
By the definition of l , Prf(k, ϕ) ). Prf(k, ϕ)) . ⊣ Lemma 8.8. The normality conditions for Prf are fulfilled. Proof. By FPE, Prf is provably ∆ 1 . It follows from FPE and 8.6 that for any arithmetical sentence ϕ PA ⊢ ϕ if and only if Prf(n, ϕ) holds for some n.
Finiteness of proofs. For each k the set
is finite. Indeed, if k is a Gödel number of a proof polynomial, we can use the finiteness of I (t); otherwise we use the normality of Proof. An algorithm for the function from k to the code of T (k) for Prf can be easily constructed from those for Proof, and from the decision algorithm for I (t), Lemma 7.5 (1).
Conjoinability of proofs for Prf is realized by the function a(x, y), since by Lemma 8. 7 , Proof. Cut elimination for LP can be established by a direct system of reductions, and it has been done in [9] , [12] . We may also get the cut elimination theorem for LP as a side product of the arithmetical completeness theorem for LP. Indeed, a straightforward analogue of Theorem 8.1 where LP 0 and LPG 0 are replaced by LP and LPG respectively holds. As in 8.1 it suffices to establish that if LPG Γ =⇒ ∆ then for any constant specification CS there exists a CS-interpretation * such that the arithmetical sentence ( Γ → ∆) * is false. Let us sketch changes that should be made in the definitions and proofs from §7 and §8 to make them work for LP. Fix a constant specification CS. Proof. An easy inspection of the rules in LPG 0 shows that the sequent CS =⇒ is not derivable in LPG =⇒ ¬CS. By 8.1, there exists an interpretation * such that (¬CS) * is false, i.e., CS * is true. ⊣ §9. Realization of modal and intuitionistic logics. It is easy to see that the forgetful projection of LP is S4-compliant. Let F o be the result of substituting 2X for all occurrences of t : X in F .
Proof. This is a straightforward induction on a derivation in LP. ⊣ The goal of the current section is to establish the converse, namely that LP suffices to realize any theorem of S4.
Definition 9.2. By an LP-realization of a modal formula F we mean an assignment of proof polynomials to all occurrences of the modality in F along with a constant specification of all constants occurring in those proof polynomials. By F r we understand the image of F under a realization r.
Positive and negative occurrences of modality in a formula and a sequent are defined in the usual way. Namely 1. the indicated occurrence of 2 in 2F is positive; 2. any occurrence of 2 from
and Γ =⇒ ∆, F has the same polarity as the corresponding occurrence of 2 in F ; 3. any occurrence of 2 from F in ¬F , F → G and F , Γ =⇒ ∆ has a polarity opposite to that of the corresponding occurrence of 2 in F . In a provability context 2F is intuitively understood as "there exists a proof x of F ". After a skolemization, all negative occurrences of 2 produce arguments of Skolem functions, whereas positive ones give functions of those arguments. For example, 2A → 2B should be read informally as ∃x "x is a proof of A" → ∃y "y is a proof of B", with the Skolem form "x is a proof of A" → "f(x) is a proof of B".
The following definition captures this feature. Proof. Consider a cut-free sequent formulation of S4 (cf. [19] , [80] ), with sequents Γ =⇒ ∆, where Γ and ∆ are finite multisets of modal formulas. Axioms are sequents of the form S =⇒ S, where S is a propositional letter, and the sequent ⊥ =⇒ . Along with the usual structural rules (weakening, contraction, cut) and rules introducing boolean connectives there are two proper modal rules:
If S4 ⊢ F , then there exists a cut-free derivation T of a sequent =⇒ F . It suffices now to construct a normal realization r with an injective constant specification CS such that LP(CS) ⊢ Γ r → ∆ r for any sequent Γ =⇒ ∆ in T . We will also speak about a sequent Γ =⇒ ∆ being derivable in LP meaning LP ⊢ Γ → ∆, or, equivalently, LPG ⊢ Γ =⇒ ∆. Note that in T the rules respect polarities, all occurrences of 2 introduced by ( =⇒ 2) are positive, and all negative occurrences are introduced by (2 =⇒ ) or by weakening. Occurrences of 2 are related if they occur in related formulas of premises and conclusions of rules; we extend this relationship by transitivity. All occurrences of 2 in T are naturally split into disjoint families of related ones. We call a family essential if it contains at least one instance of the ( =⇒ 2) rule. Now the desired r will be constructed by steps 1-3 described below. We reserve a large enough set of proof variables as provisional variables.
Step 1. For every negative family and nonessential positive family we replace all occurrences of 2B by "x : B" for a fresh proof variable x.
Step 2. Pick an essential family f, enumerate all the occurrences of rules ( =⇒ 2) which introduce boxes of this family. Let n f be the total number of such rules for the family f. Replace all boxes of the family f by the polynomial
where v i 's are fresh provisional variables. The resulting tree T ′ is labelled by LP-formulas, since all occurrences of the kind 2X in T are replaced by t : X for the corresponding t.
Step 3. Replace the provisional variables by proof polynomials as follows. Proceed from the leaves of the tree to its root. At the initial moment CS is empty. By induction on the depth of a node in T ′ we establish that after the process passes a node, the sequent assigned to this node becomes derivable in LP(CS). The axioms S =⇒ S and ⊥ =⇒ are derivable in LP 0 . For every rule other than ( =⇒ 2) we change neither the realization of formulas nor CS, and just establish that the concluding sequent is provable in LP(CS) given that the premises are. Moreover, every move down in the tree T ′ other than ( =⇒ 2) is a rule of the system LPG. Therefore, the induction steps corresponding to these moves follow easily from the equivalence of LP and LPG.
Let an occurrence of the rule ( =⇒ 2) have number i in the numbering of all rules ( =⇒ 2) from a given family f. The corresponding node in T ′ is labelled by Note that t(y 1 , . . . , y n ) has no provisional variables, and that there is one less provisional variable (namely u i ) in T ′ and CS. The conclusion of the given rule ( =⇒ 2) becomes derivable in LP(CS), and the induction step is complete.
Eventually, we substitute polynomials of non-provisional variables for all provisional variables in T ′ and CS and establish that the root sequent of T ′ is derivable in LP(CS). The realization r built by this procedure is normal. ⊣ Corollary 9.5 (Realization of S4).
S4 ⊢ F ⇐⇒ LP ⊢ F r for some realization r. The former of these formulas is a meaningful specification of the operation "+", the latter one is a trivial tautology.
Modal formulas can be realized by some restricted classes of proof polynomials. For example, the standard realization of the S4-theorem (2A∨2B) → 3.9 , [44] , [77] , [104] sections 10.2 and 10.6), and
Proof. A straightforward combination of
r is valid for some realization r (Corollary 9.6). ⊣ Comment 9.10. Theorem 9.9 provides an exact specification of Int by means of classical notion of proof consistent with BHK semantics.
In addition to Gödel's translation t(F ) one could consider McKinseyTarski translation that prefixes only atoms and implications in F . A result similar to Theorem 9.9 holds for proof realizability based on the McKinseyTarski translation too. §10. Realization of -calculi. Through a realization in LP both modality and -terms receive a uniform provability semantics.
Assume that a calculus of -terms is presented as the sequent calculus of the format
with the reading term t( x) has type B provided x i has type A i for i = 1, 2, . . . , n (cf. system G2i * from [104] ). Under such formulation a -term is represented by a sequent, formation rules of -terms become inference rules in the corresponding sequent calculus.
A straightforward observation shows that some of the -term constructors can be naturally represented as derivations in LPG. In fact the entire -calculus can be embedded into LPG ( [9] , [12] 
y : Γ =⇒ t(s) : B
The rule of α-conversion corresponds to an obviously valid rule of renaming bounded variables in LPG-derivations with abstraction. Since modal logic S4 and all standard -term constructors can be represented by proof polynomials, the Logic of Proofs can also emulate modal -calculi. As it was shown in [9] , [12] the intuitionistic version of LP naturally realizes the modal -calculus for IS4 ([25] , [75] , [91] , cf. also [30] ) and thus supplies modal -terms with the standard provability semantics. This may be considered as a more general abstract version of the Curry-Howard isomorphism which relates terms/types with proofs/formulas. §11. First order case. Theories based on the first order modal logics were studied in [14] , [40] , [41] , [49] , [50] , [55] , [81] , [85] , [86] , [93] , [95] , [96] , and many other papers.
In the first order logic of proofs constants and proof letters depend on individual variables: u( x), c( x) In [15] it was shown that the first order logic of proofs is hyperarithmetical (in fact, Π 0 1 (TA)-complete, where TA is the set of all true arithmetical sentences). In particular, this means that this logic does not admit a complete axiomatization. The logic of proofs based on the standard Gödel numbering were studied in [6] , [17] , [116] . §12. Discussion.
1. There are two provability models each having its own areas of applications:
A. The logic L of formal provability ( [27] , [29] , [98] , [100] ) with the "nonreflexive" Löb principle 2(2F → F ) → 2F . Within this model proofs are represented implicitly by existential quantifiers. The highlights of this model are formalizations of the second Gödel incompleteness theorem, Löb theorem and fixed point theorem in the propositional language. L finds decent applications in traditional proof theory (cf. [3] , [23] , [37] , [113] ).
B. Gödel's provability calculus S4 and its decoding LP with the reflection principle 2F → F . Within this model proofs are represented explicitly by computable terms. This model gives solutions to the Gödel provability calculus problem and to the classical BHK problem. The S4/LP explicit provability model has reached out to such areas as constructive semantics, modal logics and logics of knowledge, combinatory logic and -calculus, automated deduction and formal verification, etc.
The models A and B are compatible because they are both based on the Gödelian provability. The joint logic of proofs and formal provability has been found in [97] , [115] . 2 . A recent application of explicit provability model: stability of verification. In the framework of formal provability the stability of verification systems is not internally provable ( [1] , [36] ). Rather the reflexive provability model provides a verification mechanism with provable stability ([10]) thus fixing a certain loophole in the foundations of verification.
3. The format t is a proof of F introduced by Gödel in [46] yields proof polynomials (cf. [7] , [11] ) and the whole of LP and S4. Therefore, there is nothing arbitrary in those systems. The corresponding completeness theorems demonstrate that nothing is missing in LP and S4 either. 4 . Proof polynomials reveal the explicit content of modality and provide a fresh look at modal logic and its applications in general. S4 is a lazy higher level language on top of LP. Explicit counterparts of modal logics K, K4, and S5 were found in [13] , [31] . 5 . LP may be regarded as a basic epistemic logic with explicit justifications; a problem of finding such systems was raised by van Benthem in [109] . 6 . The complexity of the Logic of Proofs has been studied in [69] where it was shown that the known upper bounds on the decision procedure for LP are much better (Σ P 2 in the polynomial hierarchy) than the ones for S4 or Int (PSPACE).
7. Gabbay's Labelled Deductive Systems ( [42] ) may serve as a natural framework for LP. Intuitionistic Type Theory ( [73] , [74] ) and the second order -calculus ( [43] ) use the format t : F with its informal provability reading and could benefit from the corresponding formal semantics.
